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THE ROLE OF PENALTIES IN CRIMINAL LAW
LEON A. TULIN
Around the concept "criminal intent," as used in the criminal
law, some of the most intensive battles of legalistic dialectics have
been waged.' Sometimes the term connotes "purposive" human
activity; 2 at other times, it connotes the idea of "anticipation,"
not necessarily "desire." Again it is said that something other
than subjective anticipation comes within the ample bosom of
"intent." Even though it may be demonstrated beyond the
slightest possibility of doubt that the particular individual whose
"mind" is being probed by the mental fluoroscope of court and
jury did not anticipate the consequences for which society is
now seeking to charge him, he will nevertheless be held to have
"intended" them if a reasonable person in his position would
have anticipated them. In other words, the courts and juries
are supposed to project themselves, being reasonable men, into
the position of the defendant and then determine whether they
would have anticipated the consequences that did in fact occur.4
1 Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation (1907) 20 HARv. L. ftv. 253,
256 et seq.; Beale, Criminal Attempts (1903) 16 HARv. L. hav. 491; Cool,
Act, Intention and Motive in the Criminal Law (1917) 26 YALE LAW JoUi -
NAL 645.
2 "Intention, then, is the attitude of mind in which the doer of an act
adverts to a consequence of the act and desires it to follow. But the door
of an act may advert to a consequence and yet not desire it; and therefore
not intend it.' MARKBY, ELEMENTS or LAw (6th ed. 1905) 119.
3 "But when you shoot at Styles, I am talking with him and am standing
close by him. And from the position in which I stand with regard to the
person you aim at, you think it not unlikely that you may kill me in your
attempt to kill him. Now you intend my death without desiring it." 1
AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1885) 424.
4 Utter discord is thus achieved between the viewpoint of the psycholo-
gist, psychiatrist, and criminologist who assert that society must focus
on the individual, and the theory of the law. Beccaria in the 18th Century
contended that the existing barbarous methods of capricious punishment
should be abolished in. favor of a standarized code of penalties. BECCARIA,
CRIES AND PUNISHMENTS (5th ed. 1801). His theory reted on the as-
sumption that each man was possessed of a free will so that a given
course of conduct was the result of an untramelled choice. Consequently,
the causative factors of human conduct always being the same, differentia-
tion in punishments should be based on the acts so that the pain inflicted
would outweigh the pleasure attained by the act. Entrenched on our
throne of detached sophistication we wonder at and rather enjoy thr
naivete of the theory. But the doctrine that a man intends the natural
and probable consequences of his acts is merely another manifestation of
that theory. It starts with the inarticulate assumption that, except In
cases of marked abnormality easily recognizable by a layman, one individ-
[ 1048 ]
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Still, it is this concept "intent" which is said to constitute the
foundation of our criminal law structure. By means of determin-
ing "its" meaning decisions are purported to be made. But the
cases suggest that the foundation is in a disintegrated state.
In a recent Georgia case 5 the defendant and some other gentle-
men appeared at the home of a negro and one of them announced
that he could have until that night to leave. The defendant then
said, "I will not give him that long," and immediately struck him
on the head with a heavy weapon. The defendant was charged
with assault with intent to kill and was convicted. He appealed
on the ground that the trial court committed error in refusing
to charge the jury on simple assault and battery. The convic-
tion was reversed, the court saying:
"Under the facts in this case, would it not be just as reason-
able for the jury to conclude that for some undisclosed reason
the defendant desired to frighten the prosecutor away from his
home, and that the stick was used as a persuasive argument that
he had best not wait until that night to leave ..... It seems to
us that one of the conclusions the jury would be authorized to
reach from the evidence was that the defendant did not intend to
kill the prosecutor; and, this being true, they should have been
given the opportunity to find him guilty of assault and battery." 6
A subsequent Georgia case 7 affords an interesting comparison.
There, the defendant, a negro, while driving at a reckless rate
of speed, struck a car in which the prosecutrx, a white woman,
was riding, thus causing her very severe injuries. There was
evidence that he was drunk at the time. A conviction for
"assault with intent to murder" was upheld. The opinion does
not mention specific intent.8
In the acquisitive crimes the classical distinction between
larceny by trick and obtaining money or property by false pre-
tenses rests on the intent of the prosecuting witness. If he
ual is just like another; and concludes that if twelve jurymen would
have anticipated certain consequences, the defendant must have, no mat-
ter what contrary evidence there is.
Posey v. State, 22 Ga. App. 97, 95 S. E. 325 (1918).
abid. 102, 95 S. E. at 327.
7 Chambliss v. State, 139 S. E. 80 (Ga. 1927).
8 Cf. Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S. E. 504 (1922).
There the defendant while returning from a church festival in an intoxi-
cated condition fired at a lamp burning in a tent occupied by the prosecutrix
and her two children. The bullet narrowly missed the prosecutrix. A con-
viction for attempt to murder was reversed. The court said: "When a
statute makes an offense to consist of an act combined with a particular
intent, that intent is just as necessary to be proved as the act itself, and
must b'e found as a matter of fact before a conviction can be had; and no
intent in law or mere legal presumption, differing from the intent in fact,
can be allowed to supply the place of the latter." Ibid. 770, 114 S. E. at 005.
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intended to pass property in the goods or money, the defendant
is guilty of obtaining money or property by false pretenses, but
if he intended merely to divest himself of possession, the defend-
ant is guilty of larceny by trick. Defendants charged with
one crime have repeatedly professed their guilt under the other.
And sometimes their contentions have been upheld.1" These
cases, translated into other terms, even assuming definiteness in
the concept "intent" depend on the juries' guess as to whether
the prosecuting witness intended one or another of two abstrac-
tions which he had never contemplated and which he can never
understand. Thus, in a recent case in the New York Court of
Appeals," the defendant falsely represented to the prosecuting
witness that a lease that he had on an apartment had two years
to run. In fact it had expired. He induced the prosecuting
witness to "sublet" the apartment and received one month's rent
in advance. The defendant was convicted of larceny but on
9 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) § 809; WHARTON, CRIMINAL
LAW (11th ed. 1912) § 1126.
10 Hawes v. State, 112 So. 761 (Ala. 1927); Regina v. Williams, 7 Cox
C. C. 355 (1857); see Rex v. Nicholson, 2 Leach C. C. 698 (1794);
Rex v. Hawtin, 7 Car. & P. 281 (1836); (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL
613; (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 318. A similar difficulty exists in the distinc-
tions between embezzlement and larceny. "The force of tradition caused
the crime of embezzlement to be regarded as so far distant from larceny
that to this day, in some jurisdictions at least, a slip corner is kept open
for thieves to contend, if indicted for larceny, that they should have been
indicted for embezzlement, and if indicted for embezzlement, that they
should have been indicted for larceny and to escape on that ground."
HOLMES, COLLECTEn LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 188. The "slip cornor" was
beautifully exemplified in Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 97 Mass. 584 (1367).
In that case the defendant was first indicted for larceny, tried and found
not guilty by the jury. He was then indicted for embezzlement on the
same facts and convicted. An appeal was taken and the conviction was
reversed on the ground that the offense was larceny and not embezzlement.
The defendant could not be tried again because of the rule of double
jeopardy. Compare the attitude of Holmes, J. in Commonwealth v. Ryan,
155 Mass. 523, 30 N. E. 364 (1892). There, an employer, suspecting his
employee, the defendant, sent a detective to his own store to make a pur-
chase with marked money. The defendant dropped the money in the cash
register without registering it and a moment later took it out again. The
defendant was indicted for embezzlement and appealed, claiming that since
he had taken the money from the cash register, he had taken it from the
possession of the master and was therefore guilty of larceny. The convic-
tion was affirmed on the ground that since the money had been deposited in
the drawer for the defendant's convenience, possession had not rested in
the master. Holmes, J. said at page 530: "The distinction may be
arbitrary, but, as it does not affect the defendant otherwise than by giving
him an opportunity, whichever offense he was convicted of, to contend that
he should have been convicted of the other, we have the less uneasiness in
applying it."
33 People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927). Crane, J.
dissented with opinion in which Andrews, J. concurred.
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appeal the conviction was quashed on the ground that, just as in
earlier New York cases,12 there was no evidence to warrant the
finding that the prosecuting witness "intended" to pass "posses-
sion" only.13
Some of the attempt cases offer fine opportunity for mental
gymnastics. In some of these cases it was absolutely impossible
to commit the physical or property injury "attempted." Thus,
in People v. Lee Kong, 4 the defendant, a keeper of a gambling
establishment fired at a hole through which he thought a police-
man was watching. The defendant's aim was perfect, the bullet
passing through the hole, but fortunately the policeman was
:12 People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 13 N. E. 325 (1887); see Smith v.
People, 53 N. Y. 111 (1873); Shipply v. People, 86 N. Y. 375 (1881);
Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 322 (1876).
13 Judging from § 1290 of the N. Y. Penal Code, it would seem that the
legislature intended to destroy the difficulties causcd by virtue of the
distinctions between larceny, larceny by trick, embezzlement, and obtaining
money or property by false pretenses. The statute provides as follows:
"A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner
of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the
same to the use of the taker, or of any other person:
1. Takes from the possession of the true owner, or of any other person;
or obtains from such possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false
representation or pretense, or of any false token or writing; or secrets,
withholds, or appropriates to his own use, or that of any person other than
the true owner, any money, personal property, thing in action, evidence of
debt or contract, or article of value of any kind; or,
2. Having in his possession, custody, or control, as a bailee, servant,
attorney, agent, clerk, trustee, or officer of any person, association, or
corporation, or as a public officer, or as a person authorized by agreement,
or by competent authority, to hold or take such possession, custody, or
control, any money, property, evidence of debt or contract, article of value
of any nature, or thing in action or possession, appropriates the same to
his own use, or that of any other person other than the true owner or
person entitled to the benefit thereof,
Steals such property, and is guilty of larceny."
But the interpretation given to it by the courts in such cases as People
v. Dumar, supra note 12 and People v. Noblett, supra note 11, has prac-
tically nullified the legislative attempt to destroy the historical distinctions
between the crimes.
Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 266, § 230 provides as follows: "Whoever
steals, or with intent to defraud, obtains by a false pretense, or whoever
unlawfully and with intent to steal or embezzle, converts or secretes, with
intent to convert, the money or personal chattel of another, whether such
money or personal chattel is or is not in his possession at the time of such
conversion or secreting, shall be guilty of larceny .... " Ibid. c. 277, § 41
provides that an allegation that defendant "stole said property" will be
supported by proof of larceny, embezzlement or obtaining property by false
pretenses. Ibid. c. 277, § 40 allows a defendant to apply for a bill of
particulars in such a case. The difficulties existing in New York are thus
avoided. See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 184 Mass. 320, 68 N. E. 346 (1903);
Commonwealth v. McDonald, 187 Mass. 581, 73 N. E. 852 (1905).
14 95 Cal. 666, 30 Pac. 800 (1892).
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watching from another part of the building. The defendant was
indicted and found guilty of assault with intent to kill. The
case has afforded material for much discussion. One commenta-
tor has written as follows: 15
"If he intended to bring his bullet in contact with a police-
man supposed to be behind the hole in the roof, his act if carried
to the intended physical contact would have been criminal, and
he was accordingly held guilty of an attempt to kill. If, on
the other hand, he took the hole with the light shining through it
for a human eye, and shot to put his bullet into the supposed
eye, since the supposed eye was only a lighted hole, the intended
contact was not criminal and he was not guilty of a criminal
attempt."
One would like to ask just how a jury can tell whether the
defendant intended to bring his bullet in contact with a police-
man supposed to be behind the hole in the roof or to puncture
an eye which in reality was only a hole.
When confronted with this noose of words fashioned by such
terms as "intent", "purpose", "anticipation", "motive", "specific
intent", "constructive intent", "transferred intent," etc., one
wonders whether or not the maker of the noose is not very
often also its victim. Is this careful microsopic process of ex-
amining the defendant's "state of mind" anything more than
the use of a phantom microscope on an imagined subject? His-
tory, of course, explains much of this bizarre methodology. A
system of criminal law now conceived would obviously be very
different. If stare decisis must be a religion, let us worship as
little as possible at the shrine of ex post facto rationalizations.*
Criticism of method and nothing more is not very serious.
Criticism of unfortunate results, however, which may be begat
by method is a different matter. It is submitted that the con-
ceptual and anachronistic method used in the solution of crim-
inal cases very frequently obscures fundamental problems. One
enmeshed in a tangle of elusive concepts may think less of where
he will be when he finally gets out than of the fact that he
must get out. An analysis of the methods used by the courts
in determining criminal responsibility for injury caused by reck-
less driving when the defendant is charged with battery is il-
luminating.
It is a commonplace that an "intent to inflict" injury must
exist in order to convict for assault and battery. Discussion of
this requirement arises most frequently where, in a prosecution
for assault, the evidence shows that, to the knowledge of the de-
15 Beale, Criminal Attempts (1903) 16 HARv. L. Rnv. 491, 495.
16 "We are well on our way toward a shift from following decisions to
following so-called principles, from stare decises to stare dictis." Oliphant,
A Return to Stare Decisis (1928) 6 Am. LAW SCHOOL R-V. 215, 216.
1052
HeinOnline  -- 37 Yale L. J. 1052 1927-1928
PENALTIES IN CRIMINAL LAW0
fendant, it was physically impossible for him to inflict injury, al-
though an observer would have believed that danger was im-
minent. Thus, some courts have held that if the defendant
points a gun which he knows to be unloaded at the prosecuting
witness, he is not guilty of assault even though the prosecuting
witness belidved it to be loaded and reacted accordingly.7 The
reason assigned is that the defendant did not intend to inflict
injury. Obviously if the phrase "lack of intent" is used to de-
scribe the physical impossibility of inflicting injury by the means
employed, it can have no bearing where the defendant is being
prosecuted for battery. But the courts in the latter cases also
require that the defendant "intend to inflict injury." Here, how-
ever, "lack of intent" is used to describe that behavior which
an observer would describe as "negligence." In other words,
there can be no such thing as a "negligent" battery. 8
Let us set up three cases. In the first case X and Y have been
on the outs for quite some time. X has sworn on different oc-
casions that some day he will get Y. There is testimony to the
effect that on the day that the injury occurred, X told Z that he
was going to run into Y with his car and then pretend it was an
accident. X while driving at 50 miles an hour, within city limits,
and on the wrong side of the road, runs into and severely injures
Y.
In the second case, A is late for a date with his sweetheart. In
order to minimize as much as possible the expected frigid wel-
come, he drives his car at 50 miles an hour and while taking
the inside of a left hand curve, crashes into the prosecuting
witness's car and severely injures him.
In the third case, C, while driving slightly in excess of the
statutory limit strikes and severely injures D. There is evidence
to the effect that injury would have been avoided if C had driven
more slowly.
From previous generalizations in battery cases it would be ex-
pected that the defendant would be convicted in the first case,
and acquitted in the others on the ground of lack of intent to
inflict injury. But a study of the cases reveals that the defen-
"17Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 436 (1885); State v. Sears, 86 Mo. 169
(1885) ; People v. Sylva, 143 Cal. 62, 76 Pac. 314 (1904) ; State v. Godfrey,
17 Or. 300, 20 Pac. 625 (1889). Contra: Commonwealth v. White, 110
Mass. 407 (1872) ; State v. Shephard, 10 Iowa 126 (1859) ; Mullen v. State,
45 Ala. 43 (1871) (assault with intent to murder). Cf. State v. Barry, 45
Mont. 598, 124 Pac. 774 (1912) (where defendant was acquitted becaus2
prosecuting witness did not see defendant point the gun at him). Some
states which profess to require that the gun must be loaded have prac-
tically nullified its effect by placing the burden of proving that the gun
was unloaded on defendant. Territory v. Gomez, 14 Ariz. 119, 125 Pac.
702 (1912) ; State v. Herron, 12 Mont. 230, 29 Pac. 819 (1892).
is See for example, State v. Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 Atl. 112 (1915);
cf. CL.nx, CRImNAL LAW (Mikell, 3d ed. 1915) 267.
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dant is generally held guilty in the first two cases and innocent
in the last.
In the first case, obviously, there is no discussion of the pre-
sence or absence of "intent." If intent means anything it cer-
tainly describes such a fact situation. But in case two it is
around the concept "intent" that the battle is waged. Counsel
for defendant strenuously contends that a verdict of acquittal
must be directed and counsel for the state contends just as
strenuously that the defendant did "intend" to inflict the injury.
The court holds that since the defendant intended to step on the
accelerator, and drive on the wrong side, and since he must be
regarded as having "intended" the natural and probable conse-
quences of his acts, he intended to inflict the injury and is there-
fore guilty of a battery.1 9
In case three, the prosecution makes the same contention but
the court holds that there is no such thing as a negligent battery.
Admitting for the moment that there is utility in regarding
state of mind as something apart from behavior, the states of
mind of the defendant in the last two cases can hardly be dis-
tinguished. An introspectionist would probably say that neither
defendant "willed" the eventual result. A Watsonian behaviorist
would explain both cases in terms of stimulus and response. A
layman would say that neither defendant "wanted" to inflict
the injury. Obviously, if intent describes "state of mind" both
19 In the leading case of State v. Schutte, supra note 18, at 18, 93 At]. at
114, the court said: "The excessive rate of speed at which an automobile is
driven is a product of the will of its driver, and not the result of a mere in-
attention or negligence." See also Brimhall v. State, 255 Pac. 165 (Ariz.
1927); Vasques v. State, 259 Pac. 1005 (Cal. 1927); People v. Hopper, 69
Colo. 124, 169 Pac. 152 (1917) ; Tift v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S. E. 41
(1916) ; Schneider v. State, 181 Ind. 218, 104 N. E. 69 (1914) distinguish-
ing Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98 N. E. 640 on the ground that in the
latter the evidence showed that the defendant did not intend "to inflict
injury;" Bleiweiss v. State, 188 Ind. 184, 122 N. E. 577 (1919); State v.
Miller, 292 Mo. 124, 234 S. W. 813 (1921); State v. Brown, 304 Mo. 78,
267 S. W. 871 (1924); State v. Fishwick, 33 Ohio Cir. Ct. 63 (1911);
Commonwealth v. Bergdoll, 55 Pa. Super. 186 (1913); Commonwealth v.
Gayton, 69 Pa. Super. 513 (1918); Commonwealth v. Coccodralli, 74 Pa.
Super. 324 (1920). See also Note (1915) 13 Mich. L. Rev. 594; (1919) 17
Mich. L. Rev. 705; Note (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 717 (dealing with com-
pulsory automobile insurance); (1915) 63 U. PA. L. REv. 803; (1916) 2 Va.
L. Rev. 621; Note (1923) 1 N. C. L. RE-. 235.
If death results, the defendant is guilty of manslaughter. See cases
collected in 41 A. L. R. 725 (1926) annotation; 42 A. L. R. 1120 (1926)
annotation; (1915) 63 U. PA. L. REV. 320. See for an extreme case, Xeller
v. State, 299 S. W. 803, 804 (Tenn. 1927) where the court said: "....
we think the policy of the law forbids an 'investigation as to probable
consequences when the driver of an automobile under the influence of an
intoxicant ... runs his car over another person and kills him on the public
highway of the state." See Note (1928) 41 HAav. L. REV. 669. See also
BABBITT, AuTOMIOBLES (Blakemore's ed. 1P23) § 1991.
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or neither of the defendants should be held to have intended the
injury. But such is not the result. In the second case the de-
fendant is guilty because he "intended" to inflict the injury,
while in the third case he is innocent bceause he did not have
this "intent." '.o If intent means anything in these cases it is
merely a two-syllabled method of expressing conveniently a set
of operative facts. Defendant, then, in case two is held guilty
on the unexpressed assumption that such conduct is more danger-
ous to society than the conduct of the defendant in case three,
and that, consequently, more benefit is to be derived by punishing
the former defendant than the latter.
Viewing these cases in a legalistic way again one wonders
what has become of the traditional distinction betw, een "inten-
tional" and "non-intentional "conduct. 21' "Intent to inflict injury"
seems, when analyzed, to be a hybrid product formed by com-
bining intent to step on the accelerator and "reasonable antici-
pation of natural and probable consequences." Obviously the
conduct characterized is classic negligence clothed in the familiar
outer garments of intent. The disguise is achieved by the simple
process of going back far enough in the chain of causation to
reach a certain type of conduct which can plausibly be termed
intentional. Then by combining this with the abstraction of
natural and probable consequences the result is obtained. As a
pure problem of dialectics, no obstacle presents itself to prevent
the courts in this manner from abolishing almost completely the
distinction between "intentional" and "non-intentional" conduct.
The only possible exceptions of any importance are the cases of
pure omission or forgetfulness. The law would probably find
it difficult to single out an "act" of the defendant in the chain,
which could be said to have been intended.22 But the reasons
20 State v. Albartelli, 112 At. 724 (N. J. L. 1915); State v. Rawlings,
191 N. C. 265, 131 S. E. 632 (1926) ; see Luther v. State, s2pTra note 19, at
625, 98 N. E. at 643; Radley v. State, 197 Ind. 200, 203, 150 N. E. 97, 93
(1925); State v. Schutte, 88 N. J. L. 396, 96 Atl. 659 (1916); (1919) 17
]licH. L. REv. 705; (1915) 63 U. PA. L. REv. 803; (1924) 22 Mica. L. Rsv.
717. But see State v. Fishwick, supra note 19.
Tex. Penal Code (1920) art. 1022a provides: "If any driver or operator
of a motor vehicle or motorcycle ...... shall wilfully or with gross negli-
gence, collide with or cause injury to any other person .... he shall be
held guilty of aggravated assault." An information in a prosecution under
this statute will not be upheld, but it states that defendant drove "carlessly
and negligently." Tarver v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. 275, 202 S. W. 73t (1913).
And a conviction will be reversed if the jury is instructed that they may
convict if they find that defendant drove in e-xcess of the statutory limit.
Wright v. State, 90 Te,. Cr. 435, 235 S. W. 886 (1921).
21 "It seems obvious that under the beneficient fiction of implied intent,
we are developing a doctrine of negligent assault and battery .... " (1919)
17 MicH. 1. R v. 705,
22 Such a situation would, of course, not present an insuperable obstacle
to a determined court. A Watsonian behaviorist would not have any
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for acquitting the man who omitted to do a certain thing and
convicting the one who did something do not seem apparent.
Suppose, that in case two, the state, instead of indicting the
defendant under the simple assault and battery statute, charged
him with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to inflict
injury.23  In the former case it will be remembered that the
courts admit the necessity of finding intent to inflict injury
and proceed to find it. In other words the requirement "intent
to inflict injury" is self-imposed by the court. In a prosecution
under the latter statute the same requirement (at least the same
language) is imposed on the court by the legislature. One would
expect that this difference in the source of the requirement
would not be regarded as material. Generally, however, the
difference is vital, for where the defendant in case two is charged
with assault with intent to inflict serious bodily injury he is
acquitted.2 4  The ground given 25 is that here a "specific" intent
is necessary.2 But why, since the identical language is used
in both cases is "ordinary" intent necessary in one case and
"specific" intent in the other? Resort to legal analogy, logic
or dialectics merely increases the bewilderment. The problem
will remain unsolved as long as it is attacked from the tradition-
ally conceptual angle.
difficulty. To him all conduct is explained in terms of stimulus and
response. The mere fact that in one case the defendant stepped on the
accelerator and in the other forgot to turn on his lights or to have his
brakes relined, would be of no importance. See WATSON, BIlEAvIosmSM
(1927).
2 3 E. g., State v. Richardson, 179 Iowa 770, 162 N. W. 28 (1917).
24 People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 169 Pac. 152 (1917); State v. Richard-
son, supra note 23; Shorter v. State, 147 Tenn. 355, 247 S. W. 985 (1923);
cf. Coffey v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. 481, 200 S. W. 384 (1918). Contra:
Chambliss v. State, supia note 7; People v. Clink, 216 Ill. App. 367 (1920);
People v. Benson, 321 Ill. 605, 152 N. E. 514 (1926); State v. Sudderth,
184 N. C. 753, 114 S. E. 828 (1922). But see infra p. 1068.
25 "We may assume, for the purposes of argument, that the legislature
could declare that if any injury short of death be inflicted through the
reckless operation of an automobile, or failure to carry a light, that, with-
out reference to intent, it shall constitute the crime of assault with intent,
it shall constitute the crime of assault with intent to inflict great bodily
injury upon the one who was injured. It has not yet so declared. We may
so assume the legislature could enact a statute prescribing a punishment
greater than that for reckless driving if such injure one upon a highway.
There is, as yet, no statute." State v. Richardson, supra note 23, at 777,
162 N. W. at 30.
26 Probably the cases meriting the most severe punishment are those of
injuries caused by an intoxicated driver. The pitfalls of the purely syllo-
gistic process of arriving at results is well illustrated by the following:
Intoxication is a defense where the crime requires a specific intent. State
v. Whitten, 115 Ala. 72, 22 So. 483 (1897). This intoxicated driver is
charged with assault with the specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury.
He could not have had the requisite specific intent and is therefore not
guilty!
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CONSEQUENTIAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM
As soon as the automobile came into common use statutes were
enacted in the various states forbidding with more or less degree
of particularity "reckles' driving and providing small fines for
violation. But with the tremendous increase in the use of auto-
mobiles the violations became more frequent and the dangers
to people on the highways greater. Faced with the realization
that the ordinary reckless driving statute was not very effective
as a deterrent, the courts, believing that an increase in penalty
would in a measure decrease the evil, began to convict under the
assault and battery statutes, simply because the penalty in the
latter case was more severe. 7 Thus, a reckless driver, lucky
enough to escape injuring someone will, if he gets caught, suffer
a small fine; but another, who injures a person while driving
in exactly the same way, is more likely both to get caught and
suffer a more severe penalty. In both cases the conduct of the
defendant is the same. Aside from the fact that in the case of
assault and battery someone is injured, the sum total of the
difference in the tw.ro crimes is to be found in the penalties. The
courts having taken it upon themselves to weigh the efficiency
of the penalties ascribed by the legislatures for reckless driving,
have come to ihe conclusion that they are not efficient, and,
acting on the assumption that a more severe penalty will act as a
greater deterrent, have increased the penalty by the simple
process of squeezing the case into the most easily accessible
category-assault and battery. Although the machinery creaks
and groans, the courts are stoical in their insistence that the
extra burden be carried. Policy so demands.
The fact that the majority of courts acquit when the defen-
dant is charged with assault with intent to kill, can obviously
not be explained satisfactorily by contending that the term "in-
tent" suddenly suffered a chameleonic change when used by
the legislature. If, however, attention is focused on the eventual
results instead of on the "inherent" meaning of concepts, a
decently plausible reason for the distinction appears. Why is
it not reasonable to assume that whereas the courts are willing,
let us say, to go so far as sentencing a man to pay a fifty dollar
fine, they do not think it advisable to inflict a jail sentence of
six months? 2 8
In State v. Richardson,2' an Iowa decision of 1917, the defen-
dant was driving a car, which "as to brakes and other equipment,
was in such a condition as to interfere with efficient control, and
perhaps power to stop." In violation of statute the defendant
drove his car without lights during a dust storm. The jury
27 See infra notes 55-112.
28 See, for example, the statutes of California, infra notes 59-03.
29 Supra note 23.
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could find that he was driving at a speed prohibited by statute
and, at any rate, at a speed that it was under the circumstances
negligent to indulge in. The defendant's car struck the prosecut-
ing witness's while the latter was sitting at the side of the road
repairing a tire. The indictment charged the defendant with
"assault with intent to inflict great bodily harm." The court
instructed the jury, inter alia, as follows:
"Careless driving of an automobile and reckless indifference
to the life and safety of others, if shown by the evidence may
supply the criminal intent required. If one by careless and
reckless driving of an automobile unintentionally run over or
strike another and inflict upon him a great bodily injury such
act will constitute assault with intent to do him great bodily
injury." 30
The jury returned a verdict of guilty under the indictment.
The conviction was reversed on the ground that under the facts
the specific intent necessary for conviction could not be found.
The court said, "The difference between assault and assault
with intent to inflict a great bodily injury is the specific intent
to inflict an aggravated inju1." 31 It then proceeded to discuss
various cases in which the concept specific intent had been ex-
amined, and then concluded, "The conviction cannot stand. This
does not exclude a conviction for assault and battery or as-
sault."
In People v. Hopper,32 a Colorado case also decided in 1917,
the defendant while driving in a much travelled part of the city
at 45 or 50 miles an hour, struck a car in which the prosecuting
witness was driving. The indictment charged that the defendant
"with a deadly weapon, . . . an automobile, did make an
assault on one Frank W. Beard with intent . . . . wil-
fully and maliciously to commit a bodily injury upon the person
of the said Frank W. Beard. . . ." The lower court directed
a verdict of not guilty and the state appealed. It was held that
the direction of a verdict of not guilty of the assault with in-
tent was proper because "there was, according to the evidence,
no specific intent on the part of the defendant 'to commit a
bodily injury upon the body of the said Frank W. Beard."' 13
There was, however, evidence upon which to base a conviction
for simple assault and the jury should have been instructed
accordingly.
In Iowa reckless driving is punishable by fine not exceeding
$100, or by imprisonment for not more than 30 days. 4 Assault
30 Ibid. 775, 776, 162 N. W. at 30.
31 Ibid. 785, 162 N. W. at 33.
32 69 Colo. 124, 169 Pac. 152 (1917).
33 Ibid. at 125, 126, 169 Pac. at 153.
34 Code of Iowa (1927) § 5089. Secs. 5030, 5030-bl authorize cities and
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and battery is punishable in the same way.35 Assault with in-
tent to inflict great bodily injury is punishable by imprisonment
in the penitentiary or county jail for not more than one year,
or by a fine of not more than $500.-6 In Colorado, reckless
driving is punishable by fine of not more than $300 or by im-
prisonment in the county jail for not more than 30 days, or by
both.37 Assault and battery is punishable by fine of not more
than $100 or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than six months3 s Assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to inflict a bodily injury is punishable by a fine of not more
than $2,000 or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than one year.3 9
Superficially, these cases seem to present no more profound
operation than that of the formulation of minor premises to
fit into a preconceived major premise. Every assault and bat-
tery requires an intent to inflict injury. This defendant did or
did not intend to inflict injury. Therefore he is or is not guilty
of assault and battery. Or, every assault with intent to inflict
injury requires a specific intent. This defendant did or did
not specifically intend to inflict injuir. Therefore, he is or is
not guilty of assault with intent to inflict injury. It is not the
purpose of this article to inquire into the meaning or utility of
this major premise, but rather to point out that there is a de-
lusive appearance of an immaculate conception of the minor
premise and to inquire into the materials used in its creation. It
is submitted that, because of its various connotations, the term
"intent" has lost such a great part of what once may have been
descriptive properties, that the operation of arriving at a result
is no more than a process of pure logic, which hides from view
problems of penal policy which should be squarely faced by the
courts. A defendant injures someone while driving "recklessly."
It is possible to make major or minoi premises of the proper
stuff to get a conviction for reckless driving, assault and battery,
or assault with intent to inflict injury. But premises are not
self-creative. A choice must be made. When a court decides
that a reckless driver intended to inflict injury and is therefore
guilty of assault and battery which carries with it a penalty
towns to pass speed ordinances and to fix punishments not to exceed $25 or
5 days in jaiL
3,Ibid. § 12929.
36 Ibid. § 12934.
- CoIo. Comp. Laws (1921) § 1273.
3s Ibid. § 6699.
39 Ibid. § 6698.
1059
HeinOnline  -- 37 Yale L. J. 1059 1927-1928
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of six months in jail, when it could have found him guilty of
violating a simple reckless driving statute or ordinance, it is in
fact saying:
"In our opinion, drivers of automobiles, as a class, will react
in accordance with the severity of the punishment. The legis-
lature has specifically provided a penalty to cover cases like this
which, in our opinion is not severe enough. There are altogether
too many accidents caused by reckless driving. Increase of the
penalty to 6 months will have its effect on decreasing the number
of accidents. Therefore, the defendant is guilty of assault and
battery."
Such a process of arriving at results is more intelligent than
the one of seemingly doing nothing but finding that the defen-
dant "intended" to inflict the injury and is, therefore, guilty of
assault and battery.
It may well be that by convicting for assault and battery in-
stead of reckless driving a more desirable result is reached, but
it is quite probable that the fact that the courts obscure from
view the penological aspect of the problem tends to perpetuate the
too long existing compartmental division of criminology from
the law. In this connection it may be worthwhile to examine any
recent case dealing with this problem for the purpose of show-
ing how authorities are cited merely because they happen to
contain an apt formula concerning intent. In the leading case
of State v. Shutte 40 the defendant drove his automobile through
a city street at a rate of speed in excess of that permitted by
statute and ran into a pedestrian. He was convicted of assault
and battery. On appeal, the court first stated that counsel for
defendant was correct in contending that "both the wilful wrong-
doing that constituteg malice in the law and also an intention
to inflict injury are of the essence of a criminal assault; 41 and
that as a necessary corollary mere negligence will not sustain
a conviction for such crime." It then went on to point out that
"intent" may by inferred in law from the consequences that are
naturally to be apprehended as the result of the particular act,
the doing of which was intentional.42 The following language
from The Queen v. Martin was quoted:
"The prisoner must be taken to have intended the natural
consequences of that which he did. He acted unlawfully and
maliciously, not that he had any personal malice against the
particular individual injured, but in the sense of doing an act
40 Supra note 18.
41 Ibid. 16, 93 AtI. at 113.
42 Ibid.
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calculated to injure, and by which others were, in fact in-
jured." -
In that case the defendant, just prior to the close of a theatre
performance, had turned out the lights and locked the doors.
A panic followed and several people were severely injured. The
indictment charged "that he did unlawfully and maliciously in-
flict grievous bodily harm upon ....... " He was held
guilty.
The next case cited was People v. MorehoZlse." There the de-
fendant pointed a gun'at the prosecuting witness in a threaten-
ing manner. Counsel for defendant requested the court to in-
struct the jury that if the gun was unloaded the defendant was
not guilty. The request was refused and on appeal the ruling
was affirmed.
In Smith v. Corcarnwealth4 the defendant "in fun" dis-
charged a pistol in a railroad train, the bullet entering the leg
of one of the passengers. He was indicted under two counts,
simple and aggravated assault, and found guilty under both.
The conviction was affirmed, the court saying:
"In a case somewhat analogous in principle to the one before
us, it was said in reference to the prisoner: 'He acted unlaw-
fully and maliciously; not that he had any personal malice
against the individuals injured, but in the sense of doing an
unlawful act calculated to injure, and by which others were,
in fact, injured. Just as in the case of a man who fires a gun
among a crowd, it is murder if one of the crowd be thereby
killed.' Queen v. Martin." 4
In People v. Raher,47 the next case cited, the defendant who
had fired a revolver at a crowd of people resulting in injury to
the prosecuting witness was found guilty of assault with intent
to do great bodily harm. The judgment was affirmed on the
ground that it was unnecessary to prove that the defendant in-
tended particularly to injure the prosecuting witness.
The reported opinion of State v. Myers,, the next case cited,
fails to disclose what the facts were except that the defendant
was the confederate of some one who shot the prosecuting wit-
43 8 Q. B. D. 54, 58 (1881).
4453 Hun 638, 6 N. Y. Supp. 763 (1889).
45100 Pa. 324 (1882).
46Ibid. 329, 330.
4792 Alich. 165, 52 N. W. 625 (1892).
1s 19 Iowa 517 (1865).
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ness. The defendant was convicted and appealed, claiming as
error the fact that the court erred in instructing the jury that:
"if two or more persons combine to do an unlawful act, the
declarations and acts of each, made and done with reference to
the common purpose, implicate alike all, and each in law is
guilty and may be punished for the offense as a principal."
The instruction was upheld. The court, in the cited case, then
went on to add, "An assault may be committed without doing
any personal injury. Recklessly shooting into a crowd, and
wounding someone, not intended, is criminal."
In Com. v. Hawkins the defendant was charged with an
assault with a deadly weapon. The defendant had been annoyed
by different people ringing his door bell and insulting him when
he came to the door. The defendant, who was under the influ-
ence of liquor, finally fired a revolver and a bullet struck the
prosecutriic who was some 200 feet away. The lower court in-
structed the jury that it was not necessary in order to hold the
defendant guilty to find that he intended to hit the prosecutrix.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. On appeal, this was af-
firmed, the court saying:
"There has been much discussion in the cases in regard to
the nature of the intent necessary to constitute this crime, but
the better opinion is that nothing more is required than an
intentional doing of an act which, by reason of its wanton or
grossly negligent character, exposes another to personal injury,
and causes such an injury." 49
The court in State v. Shutte, after merely citing these authori-
ties seemingly to bear out its contention that the intent necessary
to convict for assault and battery was present, then stated
that counsel for defendant contended that a mere act of negli-
gence would not sustain a conviction for assault and battery.
For this proposition counsel cited State v. Thomas,"' which, in
commenting on State v. O'Brien,51 said, "Certainly if death had
not ensued from his negligence, but only personal injury, a
charge of criminal assault and battery could not have been sus-
tained." 52 The court in State v. Shutte then agreed with the
proposition that mere negligence would not sustain a conviction
for assault and battery and said:
"On the contrary, we are dealing with a wilful act done under
circumstances that rendered likely the infliction of such an in-
49 157 Mass. 551, 554, 32 N. E. 862, 863 (1893).
5o 65 N. J. L. 598, 48 AtI. 1007 (1901).
r1 32 N. J. L. 169 (1867).
=
2Supra note 50, at 600, 48 Atl. at 1008.
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jury as that which actually resulted from it ..... The running
of a car at a high rate of speed is an act in which the
will of the driver concurs, and hence is clearly a wilful act
as distinguished from merely negligent conduct, when considered
with respect to the state of mind of the offender, which is what
the criminal law considers." 53
It is thus seen that not a single one of the authorities cited has
any resemblance to the problem of determining whether the
penalty fixed by the legislature for reckless driving should be
increased by holding the defendant guilty of assault and bat-
tery. It is true that prior to this case the New Jersey courts
had not passed on the point, but even so, how can cases dealing
with the problem of what should be done with a defendant who
caused a panic in a theatre by turning out lights and locking
doors, shed any light on the problem of determining what should
be done with one who injures a person while driving recklessly?
The seeming similarity could not possibly exist if it were not for
the habit of courts to examine language used in other cases
and apply it to the problem considered without paying the
slightest attention to the purpose for wlch it was originally
used.
A lawyer would probably describe the cases here under con-
sideration by saying that the defendants are generally held
guilty of assault and battery, but not of assault with the specific
intent to injure or kill. He would then cite as contra to the last
statement, the states of Illinois, Georgia and North Carolina. In
these three states reckless drivers causing injury may be con-
victed of assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to cause
serious bodily injury. It is submitted, however, that this bird's
eye view of the decisions gives a picture of only delusive sym-
metry. An examination of the statutes of the states which
have passed on the problem reveals a chaotic condition of the
penal consequences that may be inflicted for very similar con-
duct. New Jersey and Tennessee are in accord only in so far
as there is identity in the name of the crime. The following
table shows how widely the penalties differ. The column "driv-
ing while intoxicated" is included since in some of the cases
the defendant could have been convicted under that statute.51
53 Supra note 18, at 18, 93 Atl. at 114.
54 The heading "aggravated assault" is used merely for convenience as
there are many variances in the terminology used in the different statutes.
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It will be noted that the penalty for "aggravated assault" is
generally more severe than that for simple assault and battery,
and the penalty for the latter is more severe than that for reck-
less driving. In Georgia, however, the penalties for assault and
battery and reckless driving are the same and there is no "ag-
gravated assault" statute. Since it would obviously have been
pointless to have tried the defendant for simple assault and
Us Ariz. Laws (1922) c. 27, § 6.
56 Ariz. Laws (1923) c. 28, §§ 1, 2.
5 Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1913) § 210.
58 Ibid. § 219: "assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon
... or by any means or force likely to produce great bodily injury ... A
simple assault resulting in serious injury is an aggravated assault. Ibid.§§ 215 (5), 217. It was under the latter statute that the defendant in
Brimhall v. State, supra note 19, was prosecuted.
59 Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1923) Act 5128, § 153.
60 Ibid. § 112.
61 Cal. Penal Code (1923) § 367e.
62 Ibid. § 243.
63 Ibid. § 245.64 Supra note 37.
65 Colo. Laws (1923) c. 95, §§ 1, 2.
56 Supra note 37, § 6699.
67Ibid. § 6698; "assault with a deadly weapon . ..with an intent to
commit . . . a bodily injury . . . "'
0 Ga. Laws (1927) § 11, 26; Ga. Penal Code (1926) § 1065.
69 Ga. Penal Code (1926) §§ 102, 1065.
70 Ibid. § 97. There is no "aggravated assault" statute similar to those
in other states.
71 Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1927) c. 95a, § 12.
S2 bid. § 42.
73Ibid. c. 38, § 34.
74Ibid. c. 38, § 37: "assault with a deadly weapon ...with an intent
to inflict . . .a bodily injury."
7- Ind. Acts (1927) c. 230, §§ 2, 3.
"
6 Ann. Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 2725.77Ibid. § 2419.
78 Supra note 34.
79 Supra note 34, § 5027.
80 Supra note 35.
82 Supra note 36. Sec. 5091 provides that a conviction for violation of
any of the provisions of the motor vehicle act is no bar to a prosecution for
"an assault committed by any person in operating motor vehicles."
82 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) c. 71, § 7601.
83 Mo. Rev. Stat. (Ann. Supp. 1927) c. 71, § 29 (c). This amended Mo.
Rev. Stat. (1919) c. 71, § 7601 which provided the same punishment as for
reckless driving.8
*Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) § 3265.
8s Ibid. § 3262. See also § 7601.
86 N. J. Comp. Stat. (1911) 3441, § 35.
871bid..
8 Ibid 1782, § 113; 1812, § 217.
89 Ibid. 1782, § 113.
90 1 N. C. Consol. Stat. (1919) § 2599.
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battery, in Cha~mbliss v. State,"" a recent Georgia case, he was
tried and convicted for assault with intent to murder (2-10
years), since that was the only decently plausible crime the
penalty for which was more severe than that for reckless driv-
ing. On appeal, counsel for defendant contended that the de-
fendant was not guilty of the crime charged since no "malice"
had been shown. The conviction was affirmed, the court saying:
"There was ample evidence to authorize the jury to find that
the defendant, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
was driving his car at an unlawful rate of speed, in a reckless
manner and with utter disregard for the lives and safety of
others." ZU
93Tbid. § 4506.
92 "In all cases of an assault, with or without intent to kill or injure,
the person convicted shall be punished by fine or imprisonment, or both,
at the discretion of the court: Provided, that where no deadly weapon
has been used and no serious damages done, the punishment in assaults,
assault and battery, and affrays shall not exceed a fine of $50 or imprison-
ment for 30 days; but this proviso shall not apply to cases of aszault with
intent to kill or with intent to commit rape, or to cases of assault
or assault and battery by any man or boy over 13 years old on any female
person." Ibid. § 4215. Query as to the result if a reckless male driver
over 18 injured a female.
93 Ibid. § 4214.
9- Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1926) 12603-2. And in case the defendant is
found to hve operated his car at more than a certain rate of sped,
the court may commit him to the county jail or workhouse for not more
than 5 days in addition.
9r Ibid. § 12628-1.
96Ibid. § 12423.
9'Ibid. § 12421.
98 Pa. Digest (Purdon, 1916) § 5320.
99 Ibid. § 5318.
10o Ibid. 307, par. 34.
lo Ibid. par. 35: "unlawfully and maliciously inflict . . . with or
without any weapon . . . any grievous bodily harm."
302 Tenn. Code (Thompson's Shannon, Supp. 1926) § 3079a-195, reducing
former penalty of $25-$100. See Tenn. Code (Thompson's Shannon, 1918)
§ 3079a-12a-4.
3-03 Tenn. Code (Thompson's Shannon, 1926) § 6495-a5, bl.
1O4 Ibid. § 6467.
205 Tex. Rev. Crim. Stat. (1925) art. 790. The previous penalty wa3 a
maximum fine of $100. Tex. Penal Code (1920) art. 320yy.
106 Ibid. art 802.
107 Tex. Pen. Code (1920) art. 1022. The punishment for ordinary
statutory "aggravated assault" is a fine of $2.5-1000. Ibid. art. 1024.
los Ibid. art. 1022a.
209 Wis. Stat. (1927) § 85.22.
no Ibid. § 343.182.
111 Ibid. § 340.57.
112 Ibid. § 340.41: "assault . . . with intent to do great bodily harm."
I13 Supra note 7.
114 Ibid. 80.
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Is this caseauthority for the proposition that a drunken, reck-
less driver who seriously injures another is guilty of assault
with intent to murder?
In Illinois the penalty for reckless driving is a fine of $3-$100
and that for simple assault and battery is $25-$100. The penalty
for "assault with a deadly weapon . . . with an intent to
inflict . . . a bodily injury, where no considerable provo-
cation appears, or where the circumstances of the assault show
an abandoned and malignant heart" is a fine of $25-$1,000, or
imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding one
year or both. Since, again, it would have been pointless to have
convicted the defendant of simple assault and battery, in People
v. Benson 115 it was found that an automobile was a "deadly
weapon" and after careful anatomical observation, that the
defendant's heart was abandoned and malignant and that he
"intended to inflict a bodily injury."
In North Carolina simple assault and battery and reckless
driving are both punishable by a maximum fine of $50 or im-
prisonment for a maximum of 30 days. One who "assaults
another with a deadly weapon or with intent to kill, and inflicts
serious injury" is guilty of a felony and subject to imprisonment
in state's prison or tQ work on the county roads for a period
not less than 4 months nor more than 10 years. Just as in
the previous two cases, nothing would be accomplished if the
defendant was convicted of assault and battery; a conviction of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill was upheld
in State v. Sudderth.126
These are the only states 117 in which reckless drivers causing
injury have been convicted of some form of "aggravated as-
sault." If no attention is paid to the scales of penalties in these
states it is quite possible that when the problem arises in a
neighboring state which has not yet passed on the question, these
cases will be followed even though the necessity for such a
penalty does not exist. It is more than a striking coincidence
that, of the states which have passed on the problem, these are
practically the only three in which assault and battery is not
more severely punishable than reckless driving."8 The reason
215 Supra note 24. See People v. Clink, supra note 24. But of. People
v. Anderson, 310 Ill. 389, 141 N. E. 727 (1923).
226Supra note 7.
2-7 In Brimhall v. State, supra note 19, the defendant was convicted of
"aggravated assault" but in Arizona, aggravated assault is defined in
the same way as simple assault plus serious injury.
'-" The only seeming exception is Iowa where there is no difference
between the penalties for reckless driving and assault and battery. The
Iowa Supreme Court refused to sustain a conviction for assault with
intent to inflict bodily injury. State v. Richardson, siupra note 23. This
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why a reckless Georgian driver is held guilty of assault with
intent to murder, is because it is the only available statutory
pigeonhole which is more severe in its consequences than reck-
less driving or assault and battery.
It is not here contended that all the ills of the criminal law
can be cured by the use in the decisions of the magic wand of
emphasis on penalties. It is rather merely suggested that prob-
ably in no field of the law is the divorce from other
branches of the social science more marked than in the criminal
law. That breach can only be widened by the complete refusal
of courts in criminal cases ever even to suggest openly the
necessity of considering penalties in individual cases. It must be
recognized that in cases such as those discussed here, the courts
are really determining what penalties should be meted out to
particular offenders. The function should be openly e:pressed.
means that the court regarded the penalty for reckless driving (maximum
fine of $100 or imprisonment not exceeding 30 dayz) as sufficient.
HeinOnline  -- 37 Yale L. J. 1069 1927-1928
